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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,

:

Case No. 920614-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 15

WAYNE D. POTTER,

:

Defendant-Appellee.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellee refers the Court to the State's statement of the
Jurisdiction and Nature of Proceedings as it is sufficient.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Should this Court affirm the trial court's decision to grant
Defendant's Motion to Suppress and Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss on the basis that there was no reasonable suspicion to
stop Defendant?

Trial court rulings on reasonable suspicion

are not reversed unless they are clearly erroneous.

State v.

Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987); and State v. Sykes. 198
Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36 (Utah App. 1992).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and
Article One Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provide, in
pertinent part,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
seizures, shall not be violated....
\

Utah Code Ann. section 77-7-15 (1990), provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
concealed weapon, and with two counts of unlawful possession of
a controlled substance.

The two narcotics charges were based

upon a small amount of marijuana, and cocaine residue found in
a small container.
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the basis that
there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant in his
vehicle.

The trial Court granted this motion by finding that

the fact of Defendant coming to and going from a house that was
under surveillance because a drunk driver said a pot party was
going on there did not give rise to reasonable suspicion that
the Defendant was engaged in any criminal activity.
The trial court subsequently denied the State's Motion to
Reconsider, and granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

The

State has now appealed the dismissal of the prosecution on the
basis that there was reasonable suspicion.

2
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On February 16, 1991, Deputy Gayle Jensen of the Emery

County Sheriff's office stopped a suspect for suspicion of DUI.
(R. 100)
2.

The DUI suspect, who was obviously intoxicated, and in

an effort to obtain favorable treatment on his soon-to-bepending DUI case, told the deputy that there was a pot party
going on at the house of Devon Potter which was nearby.

(R.

100, 127-32) .
3.

Other officers were summoned to the scene.

officers was Deputy Mangum.

One of these

The officers began surveillance on

the home of Devon Potter while they waited for a search warrant
to be prepared.
4.

(R. 166-67).

The Defendant in this Case, Wayne Potter, was not

identified by the informant as being at the home of Devon
Potter at the time of the alleged pot party. (R. 100).
5.

One of the officers at or near the scene was Trooper

Horrocks of the Utah Highway Patrol.

While at the scene

Trooper Horrocks observed a person get out of a vehicle near
the trailer being observed, go into the trailer, come out a few
minutes later, get into the vehicle and drive away.
6.

(R. 100).

At the time of this observation, Trooper Horrocks did

not know the identity of the person going to and leaving from
the trailer.

(R. 101) .
3
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7.

Deputy Mangum radioed Trooper Horrocks and requested

that he stop the vehicle that had just left near the trailer,
and detain the occupants pending arrival of the search warrant.
(R. 101).
8.

Without any other facts that would indicate any illegal

activity on the part of the occupants of the vehicle, Trooper
Horrocks stopped the vehicle for the purpose of detaining the
occupants until further instructions were received or a search
warrant for the trailer was obtained.
9.

(R. 101).

Although Trooper Horrocks did not know who was driving

the vehicle at the time of the stop, upon approaching the
vehicle he recognized the Defendant, Wayne Potter, as the
driver, and by prior experience with the Defendant, he believed
that there may be some danger to himself if he did not conduct
a search for weapons.
10.

(R. 101).

Trooper Horrocks then conducted a search for weapons by

having the occupants, including Defendant, empty their pockets.
A concealed firearm was discovered on the person of the
Defendant.
11.

(R. 100).

Trooper Horrocks then arrested Defendant for carrying a

concealed weapon, and then proceeded to conduct a search
incident to the arrest.

During this search the trooper

discovered on the person of the Defendant some marijuana, some

4
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pills, and a small container containing what was later analyzed
to be cocaine residue.

(R. 102).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court applied the correct legal standard in
determining reasonable suspicion.

This is evident by a review

of the entirety of the court's ruling on the motion to
suppress, and the court's findings, and the court's ruling on
the State's motion to reconsider.
By applying the standard of reasonable suspicion, it is
obvious that the fact that Defendant simply came to and left
from a house where it was alleged that a pot party was going
on, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop the
Defendant, especially when this Court has found no reasonable
suspicion in similar cases.

ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL COURT DID APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARD IN
DETERMINING REASONABLE SUSPICION
The State first argues that the trial court's ruling that
there was no reasonable suspicion to stop the Defendant should
be overturned on the basis that the judge, in making his
ruling, applied the more stringent "arrest" standard instead of
the reasonable suspicion standard set forth in Utah Code Ann.
section 77-7-15 (1990) . This argument by the State is not
5
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valid.

A review of the entirety of the judge's decision will

clearly show that the correct legal standard was applied.
The main impetus for the State's argument is the judge's use

(

of the term "reasonable cause" in the court's denial of the
State's Motion to Reconsider.

In that ruling the judge stated

that "no matter how you consider the facts in this case, they
do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the Defendant
was committing any crime or had committed any public offense at
this time and place that would justify his apprehension and
detention."

(R. 97). However, it must be remembered that this

is language from the court's ruling on the State's Motion to
Reconsider.

If we look directly to the court's ruling on the

Motion to Suppress, it is abundantly clear that the correct
standard was applied, and that what the judge meant to say in
his later ruling on the Motion to Reconsider was "reasonable
suspicion".
In its ruling on the Motion to Suppress, the trial court
stated that "thus, a stop can be justified only upon a showing
of reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime
or that he was stopped incident to a traffic offense".
79).

(R.

In support of this statement the court cited the case of

State v. Roth. 181 UAR 25, which is a case dealing with the
issue of reasonable suspicion.

The court further stated that:

in order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry, it
must be determined if, from facts apparent to Officer
6
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Horrocks, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
that he would reasonably suspect that the Defendant was
committing, or had committed, a crime prior to the stop.
This suspicion must be based upon articulated objective
facts then apparent to the officer. (R. 80).
This is exactly the reasonable suspicion standard articulated
in the Statute and in the numerous reasonable suspicion cases
announced by the Utah appellate courts.

The statute provides

an officer may stop a person if he has "...reasonable suspicion
to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense...."

The trial court

used almost the same, or essentially the same language as set
forth above.
In Terry v. Ohio, which is the threshold case on reasonable
suspicion, the United States Supreme Court held that "the
police officer must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968), as
quoted in State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537, 541 (Utah App. 1990).
Once again, this is the same or essentially the same language
used by the trial court in setting forth the legal standard of
review in its ruling on the motion to suppress.
In applying the correct legal standard to the facts of this
case, the trial court concluded that:
there was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or in what
was conveyed to him that would create reasonable suspicion
7
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of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant. There
was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the
Emery County Sheriff's Office could factually articulate
that would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the
Defendant had committed or was committing a crime except
his unidentified brief appearance on the premises as
indicated. The courts have consistently held that this
fact alone is not enough to create reasonable suspicion.
(R. 82) .
After reading this, the only conclusion is that the trial court
did consider the appropriate standard in determining reasonable
suspicion, and the State's argument in this regard is a
diversion from the fact of the matter, which is that there was
no reasonable suspicion to make the stop, and that the
Defendant's constitutional rights were violated.
In addition, the trial court used the term "reasonable
cause" in its Conclusions of Law only in reference to possible
illegal activity going on inside the trailer, and not in
regards to the standard to be applied in determining the
illegality of the stop.

(R. 102).

In arguing that the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard, the state has enamored itself with the phrase
"minimal objective justification" from the case of United
States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989).
The obvious attempt in referring to this phrase is to
"minimize" the reasonable suspicion standard to almost nothing.
It is undisputed by Defendant that the standard for reasonable
suspicion is less than that for probable cause.
8
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the state is tending to forget is the first part of the
reasonable suspicion standard - that the suspicion must be
"reasonable".

And as the courts have interpreted this

standard, they have concluded consistently, as set forth above,
that the officer must be able to point to specific articulable
and objective facts which indicate that the Defendant has
committed or is attempting to commit a crime.
standard.

That is the

Not "minimal objective justification".

The State interestingly notes in its brief that in the Utah
Cases since Sokolow, that have held that there was no
reasonable suspicion, not one of those cases "cites the correct
'minimal objective justification' standard...." (See
Appellant's brief at p. 17). The Utah appellate courts
obviously know what there doing, and the reason why there is
no citation to that phrase is because that is not the
standard.

All "minimal objective justification" is, is another

way of saying that the standard for showing reasonable
suspicion is lower than for probable cause.

Simply put, the

standard for determining whether the officer was entitled to
stop the defendant in this case is reasonable suspicion, not
"minimal objective justification".
B. THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED
BECAUSE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE SUSPICION FOR THE STOP
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, "the right of the people to be secure in their
9
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persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated...."
amend. IV.

U.S. Const,

(Article I Section 14 of the Utah Constitution

contains the same language).
When a police officer stops a vehicle, a "seizure" occurs,
giving rise to Fourth Amendment protections.

State v. Holmes,

774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989), as quoted in State v.
Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 35, 36, (1992).
This Court has held that, "to pass under the Fourth
Amendment, the seizure must be based on specific articulable
facts which, together with rational inferences drawn from them,
would lead a reasonable person to conclude defendant had
committed or was about to commit a crime."
739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah App. 1987).

State v. Trujillo,

In emphasizing the

"objectiveness" of this standard, the United States Supreme
Court has stated,
In making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be
judged against an objective standard....Anything less would
invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights
based upon nothing more substantial than unarticulated
hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to
sanction.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.
The facts in this case do not indicate in any way that
Defendant was engaged in any criminal conduct whatsoever.

The

facts boil down to Defendant going to and leaving from a house
that was under surveillance because a drunk driver, in an
10
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effort to get a break on his case, said a pot party was going
on at the house. That is all. And, as this Court has
previously held, that type of activity does not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the Defendant is engaged in criminal
activity.

If it was concluded that simply being in the area of

suspected criminal activity gives rise to reasonable suspicion,
that would mean that every client that came to and from my
office could be stopped and questioned if the police for some
reason suspected that I was engaging in a conspiracy to defraud
someone, or if the police believed I had possession of stolen
property.

This type of behavior is obviously unreasonable, but

that is exactly what the state wants this Court to approve.
The facts in Sykes are very similar to this case.

In Sykes,

an officer was conducting surveillance of a home for suspected
narcotics activity based upon reports from neighbors and from
an informant.

While watching the home, the officer observed

the defendant drive up, park, and enter the home.
Approximately three minutes later, the defendant returned to
her car and drove off. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. The
officer subsequently stopped the vehicle.
that

This Court then held

,f

...the facts do not support a reasonable suspicion that

defendant was engaged in criminal activity."

Id. at 37. The

mere presence of the Defendant in the area of suspected drug
activity does not give rise to reasonable suspicion.
11
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See Brown

v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 2641 (1979), and
State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App. 1991).
The State attempts to distinguish Sykes on the basis that in
Sykes no warrant had been sought for yet, whereas here, the
police were in the process of obtaining a warrant.
does not make any difference.

This fact

As noted, in Sykes the police

suspected illegal drug activity based upon complaints from
neighbors about suspicious activities, information from an
informant in regards to drug activity at the home, and a
purchase of cocaine by an undercover agent in the area.
Actually, there was more "positive" evidence in Sykes about
drug activity at the house than we have here.

In this case all

we have is the unconfirmed statements of a drunk driver who is
trying to get a break on his case.

In addition, the drunk

driver did not identify the Defendant as being at the alleged
pot party, the Defendant came to the house after the drunk
driver made his statements, and the police did not know the
identity of Defendant until after he left the house.
The State also attempts to distinguish Steward by pointing
out that the defendant in Steward was stopped even before
reaching the premises.

What the State fails to point out is

that the premises were located in a cul-de-sac, the defendant
was heading towards the premises in his vehicle, it was about
11:30 pm., the police had conducted a raid and had definitely
12
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found narcotics, and when the defendant observed the police he
attempted to flee in his vehicle.

Steward, 806 P.2d at 216.

In Steward the police actually knew there was criminal activity
at the home.

Here they only suspected it.

Still, this Court

held there was no reasonable suspicion in Steward, and that
should be the same result here.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and Article I Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution forbidding unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
the Defendant.

"Absent reasonable suspicion, evidence derived

from the stop is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' and must be
excluded."
1988).

State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah App.

Therefore, this Court should hold that the trial

court's decision to grant the Motion to Suppress and exclude
the evidence is not clearly erroneous, and should affirm that
decision as well as the trial court's decision to dismiss the
case against Defendant.
Respectfully submitted this W

day of May, 1993.

Mark T. Ethingtojr
Attorney for Appellee
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1 L. C

U

IN' THE SJVEKIH JUDICIAL D*TR!CT COURT
OFUW""•' "'•'
",»/TY

APR 1 3 1992
Ev

Depjt]

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]I
|
;

RULING ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

i

Criminal No. 1029

vs.
WAYNE DERRON POTTER,
Defendant.

]

-

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress the evidence in
this case came on for hearing before the Court on April 6,
1992.

The

testimony
stipulation

attorneys
of
of

Trooper
the

were

present

Jeff

parties,

and

Horrocks
considered

the

Court

and,
the

heard

purusant

to

testimony

of

Officers of the Emery County Sheriff's Department by way of a
transcript of hearing held on September 16, 1991, on a motion
to suppress in the case of State v Devon Boyd Potter where
the

incidents

leading

up to the stop

of the

Defendant's

vehicle were covered.
The Court finds that Officer Horrocks had good cause
to search the Defendant after he stopped him in his vehicle.
Although the officer did not know who was driving the vehicle
until

he

approached

it,

he

immediately

recognized

the

defendant at that time and, by prior experience and general
reputation, he knew that there may be some danger to himself
if he carried out his intent to detain the Defendant without
conducting Digitized
a search
for
weapons.
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR,/in/
may contain errors.
»7c

The Officer stopped the vehicle with the intent to
detain the occupants.

Once this was done, the occupants were

technically under arrest since they were not free to leave,
and the officer has the right, under these circumstances, to
search
firearm

for weapons, which he did.
concealed

on the person

In

fact,

of the

he

Defendant

found a
in the

search.
The question the Court must consider, however, is
the legality of the stop of the vehicle and the detention of
the Defendant.

If this was done in violation of Defendant's

constitutional rights, it follows that the evidence recovered
from the search incident to that detention cannot be used as
evidence.
There

are

several

recent

cases

that

have

been

considered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in
Utah that
,!

Thus,

analyze this question.

'a stop

can be justified

They
only

all conclude that
upon

a showing

of

reasonable suspicion that defendant was committing a crime,
or that he was stopped

incident

to a traffic

(State v. Roth, 181 UAR 25)

2
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offense"1.

In

order

to

satisfy

the

reasonable

suspicion

inquiry, it must be determined if, from the facts apparent to
Officer Horrocks, and the reasonable inference drawn therefrom, that he would reasonably suspect that the Defendant was
committing,

or had committed,

a crime prior to the stop.

This suspicion must be based upon articulated objective facts
then apparent to the officer.
Officer

Horrocks

had

a

right

to

rely

on

the

information given to him by other officers as a basis to
support his reasonable suspicion, but only if the basis for
the matters relayed were also based upon articulated facts.
Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the trailer
home that they were observing from about one-half block away
was

under

secured.

surveilance

while

a

search

warrant

was

being

He further informed him that an informant, who had

just previously been arrested for drunk driving, had told the
officers that there was a pot party going on in the trailer
and that marijuana was present.
Horrocks
trailer

further

stated

that while

observing

the

he saw a person get out a car near the trailer, go

to the trailer, and then go to the car, get into the car and
begin

to

drive

away.

At

that

point,

Officer

Mangum

instructed Officer Horrocks to stop the car and to detain the
occupants pending the arrival of the search warrant.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Officer

Horrocks

followed

these

instructions

and

stopped the vehicle with the intent to detain its occupants
pending the arrival of the search warrant, or pending further
instructions.

Without any other facts that would indicate

any illegal activity on the part of the occupants of the car,
the vehicle was stopped.
The Defendant was not in the house trailer when the
officers

entered

it

to

secure

the

premises

pending

the

receipt of a search warrant, and he was not identified to
them

by the

imformant

as being

in the trailer when

the

informant said he observed marijuana or that a pot party was
in progress.
If

there

was

reasonable

cause

to

believe

that

illegal activity was going on inside the trailer at that time,
there were no articulatable facts connecting the Defendant
with such activity other than his brief appearance on the
premises.

None of the officers knew who the occupants of the

vehicle were until it was stopped by Officer Horrocks.

Since

they did not know that the Defendant personally was in the
vehicle or that he personally was on the premises, the fact
that they may have known that he was a convicted drug abuser
is

immaterial

since

this

fact

was

not

used

informulating reasonable suspicion.
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by

them

The attorney

for the State in articulating

facts

states that Deputy Gayle Jensen personally observed defendant
enter and exit the trailer.

On review of Deputy Jensen's

testimony (Transcript, page 32), he did not state that he saw
the defendant enter and leave but only that he saw a little
white car leave the trailer.
There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or
in what was conveyed to him that would

create reasonable

suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant.
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the
Emery County Sheriff's Office could facutally articulate that
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant
had

committed

or

was

committing

a

crime

except

his

unidentified brief appearance on the premises as indicated.
The Courts have consistently held that this fact
alone is not enough to create reasonable suspicion.
Even

in

cases

where

the

officer

has

reasonable

suspicion of illegal activity based upon direction from a
dispatch officer or from other police officers, and he stops
a

vehicle,

attempting

he
to

suspicions.

can
obtain

only

stop

further

the

vehicle

information

briefly

while

regarding

those

(See State v Bruce. 779 P2d 646)
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Office Horrocks stated that he stopped the vehicle
to detain the occupants pending further instructions or, the
Court assumes, until the arrival of the search warrant for
the trailer, and that his purpose was not to investigate or
to make further inquiry relative to any suspicions of illegal
activity.
For

these

reasons,

THE

COURT

FINDS

that

the

Defendant's constitutional rights were violated, and that the
stop was not legally made, and that the Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.
The Attorney for the Defendant is directed to make
formal Findings of Fact and an Order granting the Motion to
Suppress.

.,

DATED this

y g - day of April, 1992.

6 ' '
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
DAY AND BARNEY
Attorneys at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT
84107
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
Post Office Box 1099
Castle Dale UT
84513
DATED this

Q ^

day of April, 1992.

T^Sft,Jzs ^A. w^<fc ri i,i m i
Secretary
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

I
I

RULING ON MOTION TO
RECONSIDER

Plaintiff,
v.

;

WAYNE DERRON POTTER,

i

Defendant.
The State has
reconsider

its previous

Criminal No. 91-2660

]

filed

a motion

ruling

relative

asking
to

the

the

Court to

Defendant's

Motion to Suppress the Evidence gathered against him.
In view of the fact that the Court missed the statement by Deputy Jensen found on page 37 of the transcript of his
testimony, THE COURT WILL grant the Motion and will reconsider
its previous ruling.
The statement of the Deputy contained at that page
still leaves some doubt as to whether or not he recognized the
Defendant at the time the Defendant left the trailer since his
statement about seeing him leave came after he had talked to
Officer Horrocks and the Defendant had been identified to him
as the driver of the white car.

No one whose testimony was

used for the purpose of this hearing mentions the name of the
Defendant at anytime prior to the stop and his identification
being made known by Officer Horrocks.
Lr 3 0 - 9 ^
_
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at Page y n

The instructions to Officer Horrocks were to stop the white car
and no mention was made relative to its occupants.
However, for the sake of this ruling we will assume
that the Deputy recognized the Defendant as the person who left
the trailer end drove away in the white car.
The i

still remains that the Defendant was not in

the trailer at the time the Officers entered, and he was not
mentioned by the informant as being present at the alleged pot
party.
On the contrary, Officer Horrocks said he observed the
driver of the white car get out of the car, go to the trailer
and return to the car and drive away.
No matter how you consider the facts in this case,
they do not establish reasonable cause to believe that the
Defendant was committing any crime or had committed a public
offense

at

this

time

and

place

that

would

justify

his

apprehension and detention.
FOR THESE REASONS, the Court affirms its prior ruling
that the Motion to Suppress be granted.
DATED this ^ ^ f ^ d a v of April, 1992.

trudge

0013mw
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing

RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER

depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
Attorney at Law
DAY AND BARNEY
45 East Vine Street
Murray, UT
84107
Patricia Geary
EMERY COUNTY ATTORNEY
P. 0. BOX 249
Castle Dale UT
84013
DATED this

day of April, 1992,
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U n u U t g . FUNK-Clerk
v

By

-n.i^J

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
|i
>
;

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
i

WAYNE DERRON POTTER,

Case No. 1029

Defendant.
The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in
this case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992.
After

hearing

pursuant

to

the

testimony

stipulation

of

of
the

Tropper

Jeff

parties,

Horrocks

and

considering

the

testimony of various officers of Emery County as set forth in a
transcript of a suppression hearing in the case of State v.
Devon Bovd Potter where the incidents leading up to the stop of
Defendant's vehicle

are

set

forth, the

Court

now makes the

following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Officer Horrocks was told by Deputy Mangum that the

trailer home that they were observing from about one-half block
away was under suerveillance while a search warrant was being
secured.

9C
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2.

Deputy Mangum

further

informed

Officer Horrocks

that an informant, who had previously been arrested for drunk
driving, had told the officers that there was a pot party going
on in the trailer and that marijuana was present.
3.

While observing the trailer, Officer Horrocks saw a

person get out of a car near the trailer, go to the trailer and
then come back to the car a short while later, get into the car
and begin to drive away.
4.

Officer Gayle Jensen (the officer who stopped the

DUI suspect) observed the same vehicle leave the trailer.
5.

The Defendant

(who was subsequently discovered to

be the driver of the vehicle) was not in the house trailer when
the officers

subsequently

entered

it to

secure the premises

pending receipt of a search warrant.
6.

The Defendant was not identified by the informant

as being in the trailer when the informant said he observed
marijuana or that a pot party was in progress.
7.

Deputy

Jensen,

who

was

on

the

premises

being

secured, recognized the Defendant as the person who was driving
away in the car and knew that the Defendant had been previously
convicted of a drug offense.

•2-
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8.

As the vehicle was leaving the trailer, Deputy

Mangum, upon instruction from Deputy Jensen, requested Officer
Horrocks to stop the vehicle and to detain the occupants pending
arrival of the search warrant.
9.

Without any other facts that would

indicate any

illegal activity on the part of any of the occupants of the car,
Officer Horrocks then stopped the vehicle with the intent to
detain the occupants until either the search warrant arrived or
until further instructions.

Officer Horrocks' purpose was not

to

further

investigate

or

to

make

inquiry

relative

to

any

suspicions or illegal activity,

driving

10.

Although Officer Horrocks did not know who was

the

vehicle

before

the

stop,

upon

approaching

the

vehicle he immediately recognized the Defendant as the driver of
the vehicle, and, by prior experience and reputation, he knew
that there may be some danger to himself if he carried out his
intent to detain the Defendant without a search for weapons.
11.

Officer Horrocks then conducted a search of the

occupants, including the Defendant, by having them empty their
pockets.

A concealed firearm was discovered on the person of

the Defendant during the course of this search.

•3-
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12.

Officer Horrocks then arrested the Defendant for

carrying a concealed weapon, and then searched the Defendant
incident to this arrest, and during this search he discovered
some marijuana and some pills and a small container containing
what was later analyzed as cocaine residue.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

If there was

reasonable

cause to believe that

illegal activity was going on inside the trailer, there was no
articulable facts connecting the Defendant with such activity
other than his brief appearance on the premises.
2.
in

what

There was nothing in what Officer Horrocks knew or

was

conveyed

to

him

that

would

create

reasonable

suspicion of illegal conduct upon the part of the Defendant.
There was nothing at the time that any of the deputies of the
Emery County Sheriff's Office could factually articulate that
would give rise to reasonable suspicion that the Defendant had
committed or was committing a crime except his brief appearance
on the premises.
3.
Defendant's

Because there was no reasonable suspicion to stop
vehicle

for

the

purpose

of

detaining

him,

the

Defendant's constitutional rights as set forth in the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and
Aarticle

I Section

14

of the Utah

Constitution

prohibiting

unreasonable searches and seizures was violated, and Defendant's
Motion to Suppress should be granted.
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4,

There

was

a

seizure

of

Defendant

when

he was

detained by Officer Horrocks in that Defendant was technically
under arrest since he was not free to leave.
5.

Officer

Horrocks had

good

cause

Defendant after the Defendant was stopped*

to

search

Howeverf

the

evidence

discovered as a result of the search should be suppressed as a
result of the prior illegal stop.
DATED this

/

day of May, 1992.

Sg^BUpfcii, Di'sreRct Judge

-400l5mw
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I nailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing
LAW

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

by depositing the same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
DAY AND BARNEY
Attorneys at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT
84107
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
Post Office Box 1099
Castle Dale UT
84513
DATED this

/A*—dav

of May, 1992
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Mark T. Ethington (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Defendant
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800

Bv

^ ^|/L^

Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ORDER ON MOTION TO
SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 1029
Judge Boyd Bunnell

WAYNE DERRON POTTER,
Defendant.

The Defendant's Motion to Suppress, previously filed in this
case, came on for hearing before the Court on April 6, 1992. After
hearing the testimony of Trooper Jeff Horrocks and, pursuant to
stipulation of the parties, considering the testimony of various
officers of Emery County as set forth in a transcript of a
suppression hearing in the case of State v. Devon Bovd Potter where
the incidents leading up to the stop of Defendant's vehicle are set
forth, and pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered herewith, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that Defendant's Motion to
Suppress is granted, and any and all evidence seized from the
Defendant as a result of the stop and subsequent search in question,
including but not limited to, a Titan 25 Caliber semi automatic
RecordeTin Judgment Rscoru
atPsce. ^ H P
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pistol serial number D823944, small plastic tuperware container
allegedly containing cocaine residue, any alleged cocaine residue,
marijuana, twelve Tylenol 3 tablets, and various other pills, shall
be suppressed and not be allowed to be used as evidence against the
Defendant.
Dated this

/_ day of

/W-'IB*'?

. 1992.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney

IOC'
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Mark T. Ethington (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
Attorneys for Defendant
45 E. Vine Street
Murray, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801)262-6800
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

MOTION TO DISMISS

:

WAYNE D. POTTER,
Defendant.

:

Case No, 1029
Judge Boyd Bunnell

:

COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through his attorney, and hereby
respectfully moves this Court to dismiss with prejudice the
Information herein for the following reasons.

On April 6, 1992, a

hearing was held before this Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
all of the evidence seized from the Defendant at the time of his
arrest in this matter.
at that time.

This Court took the matter under advisement

On April 9, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling

on Motion to Suppress wherein Defendant's motion was granted.

On

April 21, 1992, the State of Utah filed a Motion to Reconsider or for
Rehearing.

On April 28, 1992, this Court entered a written Ruling on

Motion to Reconsider wherein the State's motion was denied.

On May

7, 1992, this Court entered an Order on Motion to Suppress along with
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law wherein the Defendant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Motion to Suppress was granted.

A mailing certificate was attached

to the Order indicating that a copy of the Order had been delivered
to Patricia Geary, Emery County Attorney.
At least thirty (30) days have now elapsed since the filing of
the Court's Order granting the motion to suppress, and the State has
not filed an interlocutory appeal.
Because the State essentially can not make a prima facie case
against the Defendant due to the granting of the motion to suppress,
it would be fruitless and a waste of time and resources to proceed
with a trial of this matter.

Furthermore, it is unreasonable to

continue to let the charges just sit without some type of action on
them.

This may constitute a violation of Defendant's Sixth Amendment

right to a speedy trial.
Consequently, the Defendant respectfully requests that the
Information herein be dismissed with prejudice.
Dated this /?

day of June, 1992.
Mark T. Ethingto
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney and
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to
Dismiss, postage pre-paid, to the following:
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249
on this It) day of June, 1992.
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MARK T. ETHINGTON (4828)
DAY & BARNEY
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
45 EAST VINE STREET
MURRAY, UTAH 84107
TELEPHONE: (801) 262-6800

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION
vs.
WAYNE D. POTTER,
Defendant.

Civil No. 1029
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss filed with the Court on the 18th
day of June, 1992, by Mark T. Ethington, Attorney for Defendant, is
now at issue and ready for decision of the Court.
DATED and SIGNED this JZ_ day of August, 1992.

Mark T. Ethington
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE PF MAILINg
I certify that I am employed by the office of Day & Barney, and
that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice to
Submit for Decision, postage pre-paid, to:
Patricia Geary
Emery County Attorney
P.O. Box 249
Castle Dale, Utah 84513-0249
on this rO day of August, 1992.
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
l
i

STATE OF UTAH,

RULING ON MOTION
TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,

vs.
WAYNE D. POTTER,
Defendant.

]i

Criminal No. 1029

The Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss this action
on the ground that the Court granted a motion to suppress the
evidence in this case on May 7, 1992, and that the State has not
proceeded to obtain a trial date, and on the further ground that
the State has indicated that they have no other evidence of
criminal activity on the part of the Defendant as alleged in the
Information in this case.
The Plaintiff has filed no objection to the Motion.
THE COURT HEREBY GRANTS the Motion and Orders that this
case be dismissed.
DATED this

of September, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true copy of the above
entitled RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS by depositing the same in
the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
Mark T. Ethington
DAY AND BARNEY
Attorneys at Law
45 East Vine Street
Murray UT
84107
Patricia Geary
County Attorney for Emery County
Post Office Box 249
Castle Dale UT
84513
Dated this

/xJ^

day of September, 1992.

Secretary
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312)
Attorney General
J. KEVIN MURPHY (5768)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellant,

Criminal No. 1029

v.
Judge Boyd Bunnell

WAYNE D. POTTER,
Defendant/Appellee.

The State of Utah appeals the trial court's final order
of dismissal in the above-entitled case, entered September 1, 1992.
This appeal is to the Utah Court of Appeals, and is filed pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. SS 77-18a-l(2)(a) and 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
DATED this

ijo

day of September, 1992j_

[>k!
J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney general

PATRICIA GEARY C
(T^
Emery County Attorney

11?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Mark T. Ethington, attorney for defendant/appellee, 45 East Vine
Street, Murray, Utah 84107, this

day of September, 1992.
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